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ABSTRACT
Design is often thought of as an activity seeking 
to change existing situations into preferred ones 
(Simon, 1969). But how are designers to discern 
what the nature of this “preferred” change should 
be? What would it mean to truly design ethically? In 
the admirable but naïve quest to improve situations 
through design, it is possible to end up bypassing the 
ethical altogether. Design can aesthetically provide 
the appearance and sensation of ethicality without 
the inconvenience of actually having to be ethical. 
Ethical discomfort is anaesthetised through the 
process of aestheticizing ethics: an/aestheticization. 
Beginning with visual communication design, but 
maintaining a view to the applicability and impor-
tance of the argument for broader fields of design, 
this paper presents the case that there is hope for 
genuinely ethical design in an increasingly aesthet-
icized world by drawing on German philosopher of 
aesthetics Wolfgang Welsch’s suggestion that the 
root of ethics can be found to emerge from within the 
aesthetic itself. Design, which for so long has been a 
principal contributor to an/aestheticization, contains 
within itself - precisely due its aesthetic nature - the 
potential to return feeling to a society which finds 
itself constantly numbed to true ethical being.
Keywords: aesthetics, anaesthetics, blind-spot culture, graphic 
design, ethics
AN/AESTH/ETHICS: THE ETHICAL WITHIN DESIGN.
The question of the relationship between design, 
aesthetics and ethics is a fascinating one. Design of-
ten appears to inhabit a Janus-faced paradoxical po-
sition, torn between seeming to desperately want to 
“be good” yet ending up a lot (if not most) of the time 
having negligible positive ethical impact, perhaps 
even making things worse in the long term. In the 
face of massive environmental, economic, political 
and social challenges, many designers remain opti-
mistic as to the power of their profession to change 
the world for the better. Perhaps emblematic of this 
idealism is the surge of interest and activity in recent 
years in the sphere of design activism. Alastair 
Fuad-Luke defines the design activist as “a person 
who uses the power of design for the greater good 
for humankind and nature” (2009, p. xxi). But how are 
design activists and other designers endeavouring to 
use their skills in ethical ways towards ethical ends 
supposed to identify and understand what the great-
er good towards which they are so earnestly striving 
actually is? 
Design writers often quote Herbert Simon’s defini-
tion of design as an activity which “seeks to change 
existing situations into preferred ones” (1996/1969, 
p. 111). To conceive of design thus, in terms of change 
towards preference, would seem to suggest an 
inherent capability of design as being an ideal tool for 
responsible and active socially engaged citizenship: 
design capable of being a stimulus provoking society 
to move itself from ethically undesirable existing 
states towards preferred potential ones. However, as 
Anne-Marie Willis (2013) has noted, it would appear 
that (with the best of intentions and enthusiasm) 
designers tend to focus on how to achieve these 
preferred states without pausing to critically think 
about what preferred change actually is. This failure 
to carefully engage with the fundamental nature of 
the ethical along with the accompanying failure to 
consider the unique nature of the aesthetic character 
of design and the implications which this might bring 
to the ethical context, can undermine and destabilise 
the foundations of the very idea of ethical design.
As Thomas Markussen has highlighted, if we want 
to talk meaningfully about the role which design can 
play in actively effecting changes in society, we must 
develop a clearer understanding of what exactly it 
is which is “truly unique and singular” in the act of 
design in society as opposed to other generic types 
of activism: “The design act is not a boycott, strike, 
protest, demonstration, or some other political act; 
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instead, it lends its power of resistance by being 
precisely a designerly way of intervening in people’s 
lives” (2013, p. 38). 
At some level, a recurrent concern for society and 
desire to intervene towards its improvement cer-
tainly would appear intrinsic to design’s nature. The 
most cursory of glances into the history of design 
reveals a regular pattern of what Matthew Soar 
(2002) has referred to as “periodical widespread 
crises of conscience” (p. 34) within the field. These 
recurrent uprisings of social concern have spurred 
designers to action, inspiring many of what are now 
seen as canonical moments in conventional design 
history. Think for example of William Morris’ socialist 
Arts and Crafts concerns, the high-modernist utopian 
ideals associated with the Bauhaus, etc., and the 
cultural impact in the work of figures such as Jamie 
Reid and Vivienne Westwood surrounding the British 
punk movement. These are just a few among many 
notable examples illustrating the regularly emerging 
periodical embodiment of design’s concern for soci-
ety. However these same examples are also notable 
for their exemplification of the equally regular failure 
of such attempts to achieve the lasting meaningful 
societal change so earnestly sought, as apparently 
revolutionary design interventions are co-opted 
and assimilated into the status quo. Arts and Crafts 
becomes a signifier of bourgeois taste rather than an 
emancipation of the worker from the “useless toil” 
which Morris (2008/1888) berated. The political ideals 
of the European modernists become the disposable 
elements of the new “style” of commercial design in 
post-war America. Punk becomes nothing more than 
a “fun” T-shirt to be purchased in high street stores 
everywhere.
This apparent inability to achieve desired socio-
political change (failure to save the world) is of 
course not unique to design. We are surrounded by a 
world full of complex problems, populated by a soci-
ety of individuals who mostly feel that they should do 
something about these, but who for all their good in-
tentions never seem to get very far. In the process of 
living in the world, we are constantly confronted with 
what we perceive as real, actual, concrete “prob-
lems” in our society. These are issues which might 
be perceived by different individuals and groups from 
different angles and with different resulting opinions, 
but which nevertheless demand (or require respons-
es to others’ demands) to be faced. At their very root 
these response-demanding conundrums which may 
or may not lead to socio-political actions, are ethical 
issues.
THE ETHICAL
The ethical is one of those concepts whose meaning 
we might naturally assume is generally understood 
in common by a majority of people. However in any 
non-superficial discussion of the topic we soon find 
that our understandings of this term are not as uni-
fied as we might have thought. Part of the common 
assumption is a linkage between the ethical and the 
moral. This generally manifests in a vague inter-
changeability between the two terms, which immedi-
ately muddies the water. 
Etymologically the words ethical and moral are in fact 
effectively synonymous (the Latin moralis being a 
direct translation of the Greek ethikos) yet the terms 
are often used to refer to distinct concepts. There is, 
however, no universal consensus as to the character 
of these more specific conceptualizations. In both 
everyday and specialist language, usage of the two 
words remains interchangeable, inconsistent and at 
times wholly contradictory. Without wishing to spend 
any time on this here other than to simply clarify the 
positioning used in this instance, the conception of 
the ethical used in this paper is that which under-
stands the ethical to be neither a body of knowledge 
nor a value system, but rather a foundational way of 
being. 
Ethical considerations are lived and known un-
consciously as an integral part of being human. 
Moralities on the other hand are socially constructed 
codes and criteria which stem from the ethical: the 
ways in which we socially attempt to understand, 
implement, measure, and evidence the existence of 
ethics. As such, it is quite possible for moralities to 
be acted out or adhered to in the absence of ethics. 
French philosopher Jacques Derrida’s (1995) exam-
ple of rude politeness illustrates this possibility of 
unethical morality well:  “A gesture ‘of friendship’ or 
‘of politeness’ would be neither friendly nor polite if 
it were purely and simply to obey a ritual rule. […] It 
is impolite to be merely polite, to be polite out of po-
liteness” (p. 7). The “ritual” structures of morality—
socially constructed rules and regulations governing 
social behaviors—are not in themselves meaningful; 
they depend on a deeper ethical foundation to under-
pin their true value.
The shallow (ontic) structure of morals does not 
necessarily guarantee the existence of a deeper 
(ontological) ethical being. Conversely, being ethical 
is not at all synonymous with being good but is rather 
merely a state in which recognitions and consider-
ations of abstract value differences between certain 
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actions or positions are possible. The ethical is 
therefore agnostic towards good and evil, but is the 
condition which allows recognition of such values.
DESIGN AND THE ETHICAL
What is the nature of the relationship between 
design and the ethical? How might we approach 
this inquiry? The ethical is an abstract philosophical 
concept, but it must be recognized that design is 
no ethereal abstraction. While it may be possible 
to distill certain abstract characteristics central to 
an essence of design as we understand it (a well-
trodden path for discussion elsewhere), a pragmatic 
consideration of design in the real-world will find 
that design exists and is encountered primarily in the 
activity and output of designers (professional or not). 
Consideration of the relationship between the ethical 
and design should therefore start with designers. In 
the context of this paper, the activities, products and 
experiences of visual communication (graphic) de-
signers are taken as a starting point, but always with 
a view as to the parallels with other fields of design.
As I have already alluded to, throughout the history of 
design, individuals and groups of designers have, in 
different ways, consistently expressed social, polit-
ical, ethical concerns and aspirations. This heritage 
continues into our present experience. Although 
they may not always be aware of it, ethical discourse 
occurs regularly among designers. While at times in 
the recent past it may have been perceived as some-
thing of a side-show distraction, in contemporary 
graphic design discourse, ethical debate is regularly 
presented as very much part of the mainstream. As 
an example of this, a brief glance at the “Tools and 
Resources” page of the AIGA (2013) website reveals 
a prominent section dedicated to “Ethical stan-
dards for designers” as well as resource areas for 
designers interested in sustainability, designing for 
social impact, design for democracy, and education. 
Obviously there are many designers who profess no 
active professional interest whatsoever in social/eth-
ical issues, but it would be very difficult to accuse the 
contemporary profession as a whole of not engaging 
with such topics. The sheer number of people talking 
about a diverse array of ethical issues tells us at least 
something about the significant levels of ethical con-
cern, interest and enthusiasm present within design 
communities today. 
In 2013/14 I carried out a series of interviews among 
a range of practicing visual communication designers 
in Scotland, discussing at length their own working 
practices, and their opinions about what consti-
tutes “good” design. In these in depth narratives of 
unique design experience, a wide and vastly complex 
range of ethical issues arising in the interviewee’s 
accounts were observed and recorded. Statements 
emerging in discussions responding to the stimulus of 
what “good” design might be, range from the cau-
tious: “Now, you know, design isn’t a savior really of 
anything so it’s not going to sort out social issues or 
anything like that, but it can help” (‘Lee’, freelance 
designer). To more fundamental expressions tying de-
sign’s very identity to an expectation of social impact:
That’s for me where design lives. Yes form and 
function, but [...] for me that’s the bare minimum 
it should do. It really should be helping the peo-
ple it’s supposed to help. […] Not: does it look 
great? Not: has it won awards? Is it actually 
improving the lives of the people it’s serving. [...] 
And yeah if it’s not doing that then I dunno what 
it is. (‘Robert’, creative director of small design 
studio)
What is particularly interesting in the designers’ nar-
ratives recorded in the study, is the constant pres-
ence of conflict, paradox and ambiguity surrounding 
this recurring expressed underlying belief in some 
form of ethical foundation of design.
The same designer (‘Robert’) quoted above passion-
ately expressing his belief that design must “help” 
people in order to be considered design at all, later 
made this statement:
And when I say helping people I also mean just 
providing stuff that people want to buy, cause 
that’s I suppose nowadays people buy stuff to 
aspire to a lifestyle ideal that they have in their 
head I suppose that’s helping them as well in 
that. (‘Robert’)
For this individual the ethical imperative to “help” 
people is served by “providing stuff that people want 
to buy”. However another interviewee ‘Frank’, when 
asked the question “What do you think the role of 
design is in society?” gave this more ambivalent 
response:
In society? There’s probably two parts to that, 
one of which is good and one is bad. The good 
one is obviously it should in theory make life 
easier for people. Not just graphic design, 
product design, everything. [...] The downside 
to our role in society is that we’re obviously 
ultimately trying to sell shit to people that they 
don’t actually need. (‘Frank’, principal designer 
with medium sized design studio)
What one designer (‘Frank’) sees as the “bad” side 
of design, another (‘Robert’) identifies as an ethical 
responsibility. 
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Even when “good” and “bad” are recognized, it is 
often not a simple choice between the two. ‘Frank’ 
recognizes the “bad”, yet goes on to describe cas-
es in which he has knowingly violated his personal 
morals by designing packaging for a children’s food 
product which he knew was “absolutely shocking” 
in such a way as to appear healthy, and talking of 
the most enjoyable “wildly creative” work being for 
cigarette companies even though he detests smoking 
and its health impacts. 
Insights such as these expressed through the inter-
views illustrate something of the conflicted realities 
of the practicing visual communication designer’s 
experience of the ethical. How are concerned de-
signers to know what truly ethical design actually is, 
and find ways of justifying, coping with, and finding 
resolution in the conflicting and compromised ethical 
situations encountered in the everyday realities of 
design practice? What does it really mean to conduct 
oneself ethically as a designer?
Of course the quandary of ethical action is not specif-
ic to design, but is present in the consideration of all 
our human activity. Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman in 
his “Postmodern Ethics” (1993) articulates the nature 
of the contemporary conundrum well:
The once unitary and indivisible ‘right way’ 
begins to split into ‘economically sensible’, ‘aes-
thetically pleasing’, ‘morally proper’. Actions 
may be right in one sense, wrong in another. 
Which action ought to be measured by what 
criteria? And if a number of criteria apply, which 
is to be given priority? (p. 5)
Serious attempts to support the ethical potential of 
design must wrestle with these issues at the levels of 
both general activity and that which is more specific 
to the nature of design.
Much has been written of the general level of human 
behavior. Sociologists like Bauman (1993, p. 19) 
observe ethical coping-mechanisms such as the 
“floating” of responsibility through the separation 
of our-selves from our-actions in role-performing. 
Philosophers diagnose mental conditions such as 
Peter Sloterdijk’s (2001, p. 5) cynical “enlightened 
false consciousness” which allows us to continue 
working despite full and complicit awareness of eth-
ical conflict. The contribution of this paper however, 
will be to elaborate a concept which has particular 
relevance specifically to the area of design, namely 
that referred to in the title as An/Aesth/Ethics. 
THE AN/AESTHETICIZATION OF ETHICS
The concept of an/aestheticization is essentially 
that by possessing the appearance and sensation of 
ethicality without the requirement of the authentic 
existence of ethical being, we can create a cycle in 
which an aestheticized ethics gives us permission 
to fail to act ethically. That is to say, we can provide 
ourselves with the aesthetic sensation of ethical 
being without the inconvenience of actually having 
to be ethical. We give ourselves permission to act 
akrasiastically (akrasia: to act against our better 
judgment: knowing the right and yet not doing it) by 
aesthetically simulating either the emotional rewards 
of upholding ethical standards, or the lack of negative 
emotional experience associated with ethical short-
comings (Tonkinwise, 2004). Effectively, we anaes-
thetize ourselves to ethical pain through the process 
of aestheticizing ethics.
Some of the most obviously concrete examples of 
this phenomenon surrounding us in the affluent de-
veloped world can be identified in those products of 
“ethical consumerism” such as Toms “One for One” 
shoes, Fairtrade coffee from Starbucks and brands 
such as “One” in the UK which uses profits from its 
bottled water to fund clean water projects in Africa. 
The premise of such initiatives is that it is possible 
to do good in the world without having to go out of 
your way: all gain, no pain. The One website states: 
“You don’t even need to change your habits, just the 
products in your shopping basket” (Global Ethics Ltd., 
2013). 
These products are certainly well meaning, and 
without doubt do bring about a great deal of good in 
the world. However, what is the scope of this good 
and should we be satisfied to operate within these 
boundaries? While handing out free shoes, should 
we not also consider why it is that children should be 
in such desperate poverty so as not to possess their 
own in the first place? While sipping our Starbucks 
should we not wonder why global fair trading is the 
exception not the norm? While quenching our thirst 
on bottled water which has traveled hundreds of 
diesel miles from source to mouth, should we not 
pause to consider our own potential contributions to 
climate-change related water shortages in Africa? 
What change would really be “preferable” here? 
More often than not, instead of spurring us to action 
on these issues, the products of ethical consumer-
ism instead furnish us with a pre-packaged sense of 
satisfaction in a job well done. 
Such ethical consumerism operates to assuage 
our guilt and permit our akrasia. We are aware of 
what “the right” is, yet instead of stepping in that 
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direction, we are seduced by a pain-free alternative 
which looks very much like the right and still provides 
us with the sensation and displayable symbolic social 
value of ethical living which we desire, but without 
demanding that we change our behavior or radical-
ly alter any of the underlying systems contributing 
to the originally perceived ethical dilemmas. As 
Slovenian cultural theorist Slavoj Žižek writes: “since 
what really matters is the experience, why not go 
only for that, bypassing the clumsy detour through 
reality?” (2009, p. 53).
As we trade in our ethical states of being for an/
aestheticized simulations of these, we feel ethical 
but simultaneously we diminish our capacities for 
being ethical as we become comfortable with and 
no longer question our everyday activities. When the 
ethical impulse becomes a means solely to achieving 
the sensation of ethical being, an aestheticized short 
circuit bypassing the necessity for the ethical act to 
actually take place at all inevitably occurs as the path 
of least resistance. 
AESTHETICS: IMPLICATED
What has this issue of the an/aestheticization of the 
ethical got to do with design? The simple answer 
is that design is inescapably implicated in aesthet-
icization, being necessarily an inherently aesthetic 
activity.
Evidently—most obviously in the urban West, but 
increasingly globally—our experiences of life are 
becoming more and more aesthetically mantled and 
mediated. Of course, human life, culture and society 
has always been aesthetic, however increasingly 
there is a perception of an exponential expansion 
and acceleration of the aesthetic, reaching further 
and saturating more completely all areas of human 
experience. 
Design historian and theorist Clive Dilnot (2009) 
describes this pervasive aestheticization of reality 
in terms of the expansion of “the artificial” as the 
context of our lives. Since pre-historic times, humans 
have existed within and in relation primarily to the 
context of nature, however with the advent of mo-
dernity our capabilities in manipulating and forming 
the world around us (thus rendering it artificial) have 
expanded and increased to such an extent that we 
find ourselves now in the unprecedented historical 
state in which artifice has finally eclipsed nature as 
the foundation of our lives and become “the horizon 
and medium of our existence” (Dilnot, 2009, p. 184). 
Artifice becomes our medium when we can shape ev-
ery aspect of our environments and lives, right down 
to re-designing the structure of our DNA. It becomes 
our horizon when we become capable of our own 
complete and final obliteration through man-made 
nuclear or environmental catastrophe. In this pro-
gression design plays no mere supporting role, but 
that of lead actor. Dilnot defines design in this dynam-
ic as “being precisely that which […] mediates being 
in relationship to artifice” (2005, p. 46). We have the 
power to design not only our present existence, but 
also our futures, or lack thereof (Fry, 1999).
Design so conceived and observed as the mediator 
of being within artifice—a central actor involved in 
creating, shaping and sustaining our perceptions of 
the world surrounding us—is heavily implicated in 
the development of the situation of ethical an/aes-
theticization. At the very least the sheer ubiquity and 
pervasiveness of design in constituting our sensory 
and perceptual experience of the social environment 
denies it the luxury of claiming non-involvement. 
Design’s active and purposeful agency in aestheti-
cally mediating our experience, positively implicates 
it as playing an active role in the constructing and 
sustaining of this phenomenon. In constituting our 
everyday environment—and due to its uncritical 
failures to interrogate the contextual meanings of 
“good”, “better”, “preferred,” etc.—design regularly 
encourages the creation of the mere impression, ap-
pearance and sensation of ethicality without engag-
ing the presence of genuine ethical being.
Conveniently illustrating a graphic manifestation of 
this, Dilnot (2010) has written of this principle at work 
within Shepard Fairey’s “Hope” poster for Barack 
Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign. This image has 
achieved iconic status and might be claimed by many 
to be an excellent example of “good” design in that 
it is supposed to have played a role in inspiring and 
motivating a public to bring about political change. 
However it would be a politically catastrophic error 
to equate the emotional sensation of political change 
with the actual occurrence of genuine change in the 
real world. If the mere image of politics can fulfill and 
satisfy political desires, genuine change is no longer 
required. 
Quoting Roland Barthes’ (1972/1957) analysis of the 
“paternalism”, the “anti-intellectualism” and the 
“spiriting away” of true politics found in the electoral 
portrait, Dilnot suggests that these are not merely 
undesirable characteristics for political discourse 
but are in fact the very antitheses of: “three of the 
essential axioms – of any adequate democratic pol-
itics. Egalitarianism […] thoughtfulness […] and the 
transitive [transformative]” (2010, p. 10).
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Applying Barthes’ assessment to the Fairey post-
er; equality, deliberation and change are displaced 
from shared responsibilities to qualities to be found 
in what is no longer Barack Obama the man but the 
Obama icon. Dilnot writes that:
For politics as whole, this is baleful – the word 
is an understatement. That truth and agency 
are defined not as belonging to the collective 
singularities of all in their role as citizens, but 
by displacement only to the instruments and 
agencies of power institutes in even the most 
‘democratic’ societies a fissure that permanent-
ly vitiates their operations. Displacement, we 
should recall, is the most basic of all ideological 
operations. It is the structural evasion of what is 
the case. (2010, p. 11, emphasis in the original)
What “is the case” is that, for all he came to be an 
icon for, the actually existing version of this sym-
bol of hope and change has (not for want of good 
intentions or effort, but in actuality) achieved little 
which would have by its own volition engendered 
the pre-disbursed political sensations inspired by the 
image alone. To the contrary, a generation of enthu-
siastic socio-politically concerned individuals who 
whole-heartedly bought into the image have received 
a reinforcement at a deeply personal emotional 
level of what Barthes (1972/1957, p. 91) described 
as the “elitist essence” of the “paternalistic nature 
of elections”: an affirmation that politics is not in 
fact concerned with the good of all but with the rise 
and fall of distant aspirational figures. In summary 
of the case Dilnot diagnoses: “The problem with the 
political poster therefore is that even while rhetori-
cally evoking the political, it operates to reduce the 
capability to act politically” (2010, p. 10, emphasis in 
the original).
A further example which clearly exemplifies this 
an/aestheticization of ethical potential, is provid-
ed by the case of Invisible Children’s “Kony 2012” 
campaign. The half hour long “Kony 2012” video 
which calls for action to help speed up the capture 
of International Criminal Court indicted war criminal 
Joseph Kony, leader of the LRA militant group active 
in central Africa, was the fastest ever online video at 
the time to reach one hundred million views (six days 
after its publication). Within these first few days, 
fifty-eight percent of young American adults had 
become aware of the previously obscure charitable 
organization Invisible Children and their campaign 
to “make Kony famous” (Kanczula, 2012). Countless 
non-profit organizations campaigning for years on 
similar issues could only dream of such levels of 
exposure. 
The success of Kony 2012 as we now know, was of 
course short-lived. The passion of millions of young 
people inspired by a slickly designed video and online 
campaign to “stop at nothing” on their path to “shap-
ing human history” (Invisible Children, 2012), some-
how failed to translate into physical action in the real 
world. Invisible Children’s flagship awareness raising 
event “Cover the Night” was a complete washout as 
supporters turned out to be somewhat less passion-
ate in person than they were on Facebook (Carroll, 
2012). 
While we can speculate upon various reasons as to 
why the physical participation element of Kony 2012 
turned out to be such a damp squib, in this mix it is 
certainly possible to observe the workings of an/aes-
theticization. Just as in Dilnot’s analysis of the oper-
ation of the political poster, in this case it is possible 
to consider how the powerfully designed rhetorical 
evocation of ideas of empowerment, participation, 
and involvement so effectively produced by the Kony 
2012 video actually operated to reduce capabilities 
to act when it came down to it. The aesthetic experi-
ence of the sensation of being a part of a triumphant, 
powerful, emancipatory, world-changing movement 
had already been pre-dispensed by watching the 
video, wearing the wrist band and sending a tweet. 
The design of the campaign, so successful from the 
moment the video starts to play in immediately in-
spiring aesthetic sensations of active world changing 
participatory involvement, also anaesthetizes with 
the same stroke, cutting short the hunger to actively 
participate further. 
The apparent catch-22 here of course is that the 
better the aesthetics of the design in captivating, 
drawing in and involving the individual, the greater 
the potential for an/aestheticization. It is extreme-
ly unlikely that Kony 2012 would have been such a 
success had their video not been so well designed 
and produced. Yet perhaps the campaign might have 
enjoyed longer lasting and more meaningful impact 
had it offered a less polished, less completely aes-
theticized experience, instead of negating its own 
itch with its simultaneous scratch.
This question of an/aestheticization—of the simulta-
neously anaesthetizing potential of the aesthetic—is 
one which designers seeking to be truly ethical in 
their work must address. Failure to do so leaves the 
keen but naïve designer open to the possibilities 
of applying their considerable skill and expertise 
towards projects which display a surface of eth-
icality but which may in fact effectively serve to 
suppress ethical potentials as the Obama and Kony 
examples demonstrate. In the worst of these cases 
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good design can become an unconsciously deceptive 
veneer legitimating ideological positions or behavior 
patterns which the designer would never have set 
out to support. 
Is design necessarily fated to create and sustain in-
herently unethical conditions of an/aestheticization? 
Does design, for all its sporadic Utopian ambition ac-
tually pose a constant danger to society? This rather 
gloomy train of thought brings to mind certain ac-
counts of widespread aestheticization such as those 
voiced by leader of the Situationist International Guy 
Debord (1994/1967) in The Society of the Spectacle, 
and philosopher of postmodernity Jean Baudrillard 
(1994/1981) in positing the “hyperreal simulacra.” 
Such accounts would give the impression of a largely 
pessimistic outlook for ethical aesthetics by inferring 
that because it is the aesthetic which creates and 
sustains the an/aestheticized condition, aesthetics 
cannot now behave in any other way than to dig us 
deeper into this state.
Are aesthetics therefore a lost ethical cause? I do 
not believe so. In the final section of this paper I will, 
by introducing the work of German aesthetic phi-
losopher Wolfgang Welsch (1997), attempt to paint 
a more hopeful picture of the potential relationship 
between aesthetics and ethics based on Welsch’s 
argument that the ethical is in fact intrinsic to and 
emergent from within aesthetics, and that therefore 
the aesthetic is equally capable of returning sensa-
tion to those areas which it anaesthetizes.
HOPE FOR DESIGN: THE ETHICAL WITHIN THE 
AESTHETIC
In the various essays contained in his collection 
Undoing Aesthetics (1997), Wolfgang Welsch at-
tempts to uncover and lay bare some aspects of the 
operation of the aesthetic in society, and in doing 
so teases out some of the subtle but deep links and 
connections between the aesthetic and the ethical.
The root of our word aesthetic, comes from the Greek 
aisthesis referring to the sensuous through a double 
sense of both perception and sensation. The percep-
tive element relates to the cognitive recognition of 
values within aesthetic categories: colors, textures, 
tastes, smells, sounds. The element of sensation on 
the other hand relates to the more emotional eval-
uation of sensory experience on scales of like and 
dislike, attraction or repulsion. As Welsch draws 
out, even at this basic level it is possible to begin to 
identify elements of the ethical actually emerging 
from within the aesthetic itself. He identifies two fun-
damentally aesthetic ethical imperatives, for which 
he puts forwards the neologism aesthet/hic—an ob-
vious contraction of aesthetic and ethical—intended 
for use to “designate those parts of aesthetics which 
of themselves contain ethical elements” (1997, p. 61).
The first of these emergences of the ethical from 
within the aesthetic he refers to as the vital impera-
tive: in which aesthetic sensibility serves the primary 
ethical goal of the preservation of life. At this level 
the rudimentary ethical goal of continued survival 
is facilitated by raw aesthetic perception and sen-
sation. This primordial aisthesis initially serves us 
to identify distinctions between those objects and 
situations beneficial or detrimental to our survival. It 
is practical cognition expressed on a scale of plea-
sure and displeasure. This can be obviously seen 
in the instinctive preference of a young child for 
warmth over cold, and in dislike of bitter foods which 
might indicate toxicity, etc. This imperative to sustain 
life is the first foundational ethical imperative, and 
one which emerges with and through aesthetics. 
Therefore Welsch classifies it the first aesthet/hic 
imperative. This vital aesthet/hic imperative is ethics 
at a primordial level, bearing little resemblance to the 
complex creature we recognize as ethics today, but it 
is a starting point nonetheless. As Welsch writes “It 
served life, keeping yourself alive, and survival (zen, 
soteria) – but not yet the good life (eu zen)” (1997, 
p. 63).
The second aesthet/hic imperative which Welsch 
advances is the elevatory aesthetic imperative: that 
which requires us to rise above raw sensory aisthe-
sis to a higher level in which aesthetic sensibility 
serves not only the vital functions of survival but of 
judgment, reflection, communication and pleasure 
perceived autonomously from vital concerns and 
often prioritized and privileged over them. This is 
elevatory in two senses, firstly that such perceiving 
must take place in a state of reflection raised above 
the immediate pleasure/pain concerns of survival, 
but secondly, because it is this ability to rise above 
purely physical vital concerns in which, Welsch 
suggests, is found the “anthropological difference” 
(1997, p. 64): that which sets us apart from and above 
those other living creatures and inanimate objects 
who lack this capacity for higher level reflection. He 
draws attention right back to Aristotle who suggest-
ed that what makes humans superior animals is their 
ability to recognize and act upon not just the raw 
vital sensuous values of useful and harmful, but also 
higher aesthetic qualities whose recognition requires 
abilities of reflection and communication: better and 
worse, just and unjust, beautiful and ugly, harmonic 
Artifact | 2015 | Volume III, Issue 3 | Pages 4.1-4.11 4.8
and discordant etc. Welsch emphasizes the absolute 
importance of this seemingly innocuous observation, 
writing:
Insofar as we are living creatures, the vital im-
perative is our first aesthet/hic imperative too 
and the elevatory imperative just the second. 
But, insofar as we are humans, the elevatory 
imperative is our constitutive and decisive 
imperative. In human terms it is the categorical 
imperative par excellence. (1997, p. 64)
The human-ness of humanity is found in positive re-
sponse to the demand to rise above matters of base 
survival. One who fails on this account to rise above 
mere physical existence by possessing aesthet/hic 
sensitivity, though walking and humanoid in form, 
cannot be said to be human in the full sense of the 
word. 
Such a being would be reminiscent of the horrifying 
figure of the “Muselmann”, a name given to the living 
dead of the Nazi concentration camps: the empty 
shell of a human being who has been de-humanized 
in every way. In Remnants of Auschwitz, Giorgio 
Agamben (1999) documents eyewitness accounts of 
these Musselmänner, quoting from among others the 
testimony of internee Jean Améry:
“The so-called Muselmann, as the camp lan-
guage termed the prisoner who was giving up 
and was given up by his comrades, no longer 
had room in his consciousness for the contrasts 
good or bad, noble or base, intellectual or unin-
tellectual. He was a staggering corpse, a bundle 
of physical functions in its last convulsions.” 
(p.41)
The human who has relinquished his ability to aes-
thetically “rise above” is really no human at all. It is in 
this sense that Welsch posits aesthetic sensitivity as 
the ultimate human categorical imperative: if there is 
something which humans must do—because to not 
do this means to lose precisely what it means to be 
human—it is to maintain our grasp on the capability 
to rise above the physical. It is through this elevatory 
aesthet/hic imperative to seek to rise above the raw 
physical sensuous that we can begin to recognize 
connections and linkages between the aesthetic 
realm and phenomena more easily recognized as 
ethical in nature.
In illustration of this linkage between aesthetic sen-
sation and perception and the ethical, Welsch gives 
the example of tolerance. A man who has perfectly 
internalized the principles of tolerance would still 
be able to practice the most extreme injustices, and 
with the clearest of consciences, were he to lack 
the aesthetic sensibility to recognize the differences 
between himself and his fellow man which are to be 
tolerated. The moral code of tolerance—the an/aes-
theticized surface—may be subscribed to, but the 
truly ethical act of being tolerant of difference slips 
by unnoticed as the difference itself is not attended 
to. As Welsch writes: “Sensibility for differences 
is thus a real condition for tolerance. – Perhaps we 
live in a society which talks too much of tolerance 
but possesses too little sensibility” (1997, p. 27). The 
examples of the Muselmann and Welsch’s intolerant 
man serve to demonstrate how the absolute lack of 
aesthetic sensitivity precludes the existence of eth-
ics. Conversely therefore we can see that aesthetic 
sensitivity is a fundamentally prerequisite foundation 
to the ethical. 
What impact does this insight have on the question of 
design’s role in an/aestheticization? Building on this 
aesthetic foundation for ethics, Welsch argues that 
aesthetics actually contains within itself the capabil-
ities to combat an/aestheticization. If the aesthetic, 
which has been implicated in the anaesthetizing 
of ethics is, at its very root, fundamentally ethical, 
then surely it also contains within itself potentials to 
equally promote sensation, perception and reflection 
on issues of ethics leading to a more, rather than less 
ethically sensitive society.
AESTHETIC JUSTICE 
Welsch calls for the development of a “genuinely 
aestheticized culture” (1997, p. 25) built not on empty 
an/aestheticized structural morality but on radically 
aesthet/hic ethical being. Such an objective is per-
haps more easily said than done, particularly consid-
ering the historical antagonism between the disci-
plines of aesthetics and ethics. Since antiquity (from 
Plato’s stance towards the poets, to various periods 
of religious/secular iconoclasm) the aesthetic has 
been considered by many to be a dangerous threat 
to society, something to be controlled and regulated 
in the name of ethics. In modernity the aesthetic to 
some extent escaped this oppression but by the same 
stroke rendered itself impotent by becoming entirely 
separated and irreconcilable from ethics through the 
appeal to autonomy. Subsequently, as Welsch writes 
“aesthetic viewpoints have had no role to play for 
modern ethics since Kant” (1997, p. 60).
Welsch links these traditional separations of aesthet-
ics and ethics to a critical misunderstanding of the 
aesthet/hic imperatives. Traditional approaches gen-
erally, once the elevatory aesthetic imperative has 
been established, part company with and look down 
upon the raw, base, animalistic sensory aisthesis of 
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the vital imperative. In following the imperative to 
rise above raw sensibility traditional aesthetic think-
ing makes the critical error of rejecting raw aisthesis 
wholesale. Such strategies result in the “perversion” 
of true aesthetics in pursuit of programs of aesthetic 
“domination, banishment and regimentation” (1997, 
p. 68). These are the projects by which aesthetic 
judgment becomes the reserve of the privileged elite 
and must be preserved and protected from con-
tamination by those lower impulses of the common 
masses.
It does not take much effort to bring to mind exam-
ples of this type of thinking within the design world. 
The massive and enduring snobbery surrounding the 
use of certain typefaces in graphic design is but one 
example. Designers, who pride themselves on being 
a creative and diverse group can equally be some of 
the worst culprits in forcefully imposing their own 
visions of aesthetic perfection.
In pursuing the authentic ethical potential of aesthet-
ics, Welsch rejects these traditional aesthetic abso-
lutisms drawing instead upon the aesthetic thinking 
of Theodor Adorno in his assertion that the power of 
the aesthetic is not to be controlled and regulated but 
is an emancipatory force in its own right.
Regulation which would seek to impose universal 
aesthetic standards leads inevitably to the trap of 
the intolerant man. In Adorno’s Negative Dialectics, 
(2004/1966) he speaks out against the uncritical as-
sumption that equality and justice naturally go hand 
in hand, positing a distinction between two types 
of implied justice: legalistic justice and aesthetic 
justice. “In law the formal principle of equivalence 
becomes the norm; everyone is treated alike. An 
equality in which differences perish secretly serves 
to promote inequality” (p. 309).
Formal equality of all before the eyes of the law 
would appear to be a rationally desirable condition. 
What Adorno points out is that where such equality is 
manufactured among people through the crushing of 
genuinely existing differences, this cannot properly 
be called just. A principle of radical equality such as 
that theoretically demanded by modern legal systems 
runs the risk of becoming a principle of homogeniza-
tion. Under such a system justice can be done to the 
homogenized average figure but never to the unique, 
different and heterogeneous. While it is of course 
absolutely necessary to seek common grounds and 
patterns in society, in reality there is no universal 
homogeneity, only absolute heterogeneity. It is only 
through openness to the aesthetic perception and 
recognition of differences that “justice to the hetero-
geneous” (Welsch, 1997, p. 68) can properly emerge.
DESIGNING A BLIND-SPOT CULTURE
In a state of total aestheticization, our overwhelmed 
senses lose track of that which has been excluded. 
As Welsch writes:
Total aestheticization results in its opposite. 
Where everything becomes beautiful, nothing is 
beautiful any more: continued excitement leads 
to indifference; aestheticization breaks into 
anaestheticization. It is, then, precisely aes-
thetic reasons which speak in favor of breaking 
through the turmoil of aestheticization. Amidst 
the hyperaestheticization aesthetically fallow 
areas are necessary. (1997, p. 25)
Aesthetic strategies—those which lie at the heart 
of design activity—are perfectly placed to carve 
out these fallow areas in ethically an/aestheticized 
realities. Aesthetic interventions can create the 
necessary spaces for reflection in which attention 
and awareness in relation to the exclusions and 
blind spots we have created for ourselves can be 
recovered.
Proper aesthetic sensitivity, is by its nature attentive 
towards that which is different and excluded. While 
legalistic justice is interested in blanket principles 
which can apply to a range of situations, aesthet-
ic justice embraces the plurality of the singular in 
which each unique situation or individual is dealt with 
according to their uniqueness and difference. Welsch 
writes:
In that reflected aesthetic consciousness is 
sensitized for fundamental differences as a 
matter of principle it is able to recognize and 
to respect the peculiarity and irreducibility of 
forms of life more easily than widespread social 
consciousness, which denies alterities rather 
than acknowledging them. Hence an aesthet-
ically sensitized awareness can also become 
effective within the life-world by illuminating, 
clarifying and helping out. The readiness is 
constitutively built in to be critically attentive of 
borders and exclusions, to see through impe-
rialisms and—being, as a matter of principle 
allergic to injustice—to intervene wherever 
excessive domination is found and wherever 
the rights of the oppressed must be espoused. 
(1997, p. 26)
The aesthetic’s predisposition towards justice to 
the heterogeneous allows us to see how it is in fact 
specifically aesthetic sensitivity which best allows 
us to conceive of the ethical. The challenge for truly 
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ethical design then is to find ways of unlocking this 
aesthet/hic potential: to be a practice not of an/aes-
theticization but rather a practice of the implemen-
tation of aesthetic interventions which draw atten-
tion explicitly to our ethical blind-spots, constantly 
disrupting and destabilizing existing an/aestheticized 
equilibriums. 
A shift in the gear of aesthetic production from hyper 
embellishment, enhancement, and experience, to a 
more reflective mode which draws attention to that 
which we do not notice would be able to foreground 
precisely the objects of our inattentions, nurturing an 
atmosphere of much greater sensitivity to differenc-
es, exclusions, oppressions and intolerances. This 
possibility, which Welsch calls a “blind-spot culture” 
(1997, p. 25), offers the hope that design is not fated 
to an/aestheticize but does in fact hold within itself 
the potential to be properly ethical if only the terms of 
its aesthet/hic nature would be renegotiated. 
How can such a blind-spot culture be encouraged? 
What could practical ethical aesthetic strategies to 
subvert an/aestheticization and encourage genuinely 
ethical aestheticization be for design, which for so 
long has been a principal contributor to an/aesthet-
icization? These questions pose difficult yet not 
insurmountable challenges in the pursuit of an ethical 
design practice. 
The majority of graphic design activity falls far short 
of this goal of genuine ethics. The most well-inten-
tioned strategies of design activism can be subsumed 
within the expectations of the status quo produc-
ing an/aesthetic mainstream. Cases such as the 
International Advertising Association’s woeful 2009 
“Hopenhagen” campaign—effectively a corporate 
greenwashing exercise at the Cop-15 climate change 
conference—demonstrate the potential abuses of 
design in the name of ethical causes (Boehnert, 2011). 
Even radical groups such as Adbusters who attempt 
to appropriate conventional design strategies as a 
means of protest and resistance become hopelessly 
predictable and ignorable (Adbusters, 2014).
It is however possible to discover traces of what we 
might call blind-spot practices at work within the 
realms of contemporary visual communication de-
sign. Recent years have seen the rise of an emergent 
wave of so called “critical” and “speculative” design 
practices (Kyes & Owens, 2007; Ericson, Frostner, 
Kyes, Teleman, & Williamsson, 2009; Sueda, 2014). 
In the best instances amongst the work of design-
ers linked to these developments we can discern 
shadows of possible blind-spot practices as we 
find designers questioning the possibilities for what 
graphic design can be and how it can operate within 
society. 
Designers such as the Dutch groups Metahaven and 
Experimental Jetset (each in their own very different 
ways) demonstrate tantalizing possibilities for radical 
reconceptualizations of design and the use of aes-
thetic form to break with conventional operations of 
visual communication, thereby creating new spaces 
for critical thinking. To a great extent, however, many 
of these speculative critical interventions appear as 
yet to be in an embryonic state, their actually-ex-
isting experimental aesthetic forms often failing in 
practice to live up to their theoretical promise. 
We should, though, of course not make the mistake of 
believing that such emergent blind-spot practices are 
entirely new phenomena. Following the Dutch critical 
design trajectory back to the nineteen seventies, the 
work of Jan van Toorn provides us with an example 
of a design practice which successfully combined 
and implemented a deep theoretical knowledge of 
and concern for the ethical power of the image into 
practical aesthetic strategies through his trademark 
techniques of dialogical and journalistic image pro-
duction (van Toorn, 2006; Kuijpers, 2013).
Employing the aesthetic means of design to return 
vision to our ethical blind-spots has always been 
and always will remain a possibility. The aesthetic 
capabilities of design are always active in constitut-
ing and re-constituting our everyday realities. The 
challenge of creating a blind-spot culture for each 
new generation is to find the specific techniques 
which will be most effective for drawing attention to 
the overlooked, repressed and neglected within the 
present nature of this constantly changing aesthetic 
environment. The good news is that these capabil-
ities are always already potentially present within 
the aesthet/hic nature of design. As Clive Dilnot has 
written:
design is the discovery of what the artificial can 
be for us. Since the artificial is also today the 
frame of our possibilities as human beings, to 
discover what the artificial can be for us is to 
discover what our possibility can be and hence 
(here its third dimension) it is also a discovery 
of what possibility can be. (Dilnot, 2009, p. 84)
We must find hope in the possibility that design, 
precisely due its aesthetic nature, has the in-built po-
tential to be used to return feeling to a society which 
finds itself constantly numbed to ethical being.
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